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NOTES
TREADING IN HIGH TIDE: EXAMINING MORAL
HAZARD WITHIN FORECLOSURE REFORM
LAURA P. POLLARD*
INTRODUCTION
A major debate within the areas of mortgage and foreclo-
sure law is that of “moral hazard.”  As specifically applied within
the context of financing in the housing industry, moral hazard
carries a two-part ethical concern.  The first ethical concern is
that legislative refinancing and assistance programs, designed to
assist borrowers who “behaved responsibly” but nevertheless fell
upon difficult economic times and became unable to repay their
mortgage loan obligations, will also permit borrowers who
behaved irresponsibly to receive assistance.1  The second ethical
concern is that, by granting relief to homeowners who have
defaulted on their mortgages, the law cultivates an acceptance of
loan default, which encourages other borrowers to default pur-
posefully if doing so will benefit them financially.2  This applica-
tion of the concept of “moral hazard” pits a subjective standard
of moral and ethical obligations to repay debt owed on mortgage
loans against an objective economic standard, where homeown-
ers pay more in mortgage and interest than their homes are
worth.3  As borrowers desperately turn to the law for guidance
* J.D. Candidate, Notre Dame Law School, 2013.  I would like to thank
Professor Judy Fox for the inspiration and guidance I received while writing this
Note.  I would also like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy for their hard work in editing and providing feedback.
1. Ruth Simon & Nick Timiraos, Finessing ‘Moral Hazard’ Is Tough in Hous-
ing Plan, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB12351742
6207837283.html; see also Elyse Cherry, Op-Ed., A Realistic Fix for the Mortgage
Crisis, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/28/
opinion/la-oe-cherry-foreclosure-20111028.
2. See generally Richard H. Thaler, Underwater, but Will They Leave the Pool,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/24/business/
economy/24view.html.
3. Kathryn Hatter, How to Define “Underwater Mortgage,” S.F. GATE, http://
homeguides.sfgate.com/define-underwater-mortgage-9500.html (last visited
Feb. 16, 2013).
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and aid to regain control of their financial situations and home
ownership, lending institutions push back, citing moral hazard as
a reason to oppose assistance programs, and ethical obligations
as a reason that foreclosure should not be an acceptable solu-
tion.4  Although lending institutions have some valid reasons to
fear the changing ethical climate regarding loan and debt obliga-
tions,5 there are greater concerns, both ethical and economic,
involved in resisting corrective measures for borrowers facing
default.  The economy cannot be revived and returned to a pat-
tern of growth when so many borrowers continue to swim
upstream with their finances, making payments on a mortgage
that will never be fully repaid.  Furthermore, in their opposition
to assistance programs for homeowners, lenders have solidified
their role as the “enemy.”  Many homeowners blame lending
institutions for their mortgage and home ownership woes, won-
dering why these financial experts would approve loans that were
later deemed inadvisable and risky.6  In failing to accept respon-
sibility for their own role in the mortgage crisis, and in further
opposing corrective measures, lenders have done even more
damage to the ethical climate of the loan industry because bor-
rowers have become angry and mistrustful of lending institu-
tions.7  In light of the difficult economic climate and the
emotionally-driven tension between borrowers and lenders, the
law must view the situation from an objective perspective, and
should take measures that will address and correct the situation
4. See Gregory Scott Crespi, The Trillion Dollar Problem of Underwater Home-
owners: Avoiding a New Surge of Foreclosures by Encouraging Principal-Reducing Loan
Modifications, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 153, 182 (2011); see also Brent T. White,
Underwater and Not Walking Away: Shame, Fear and the Social Management of the
Housing Crisis, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 971 (2010).
5. Carrie Bay, Survey: More Underwater Homeowners Open to Strategic Default,
DSNEWS.COM (May 13, 2011), http://www.dsnews.com/articles/survey-more-
underwater-homeowners-open-to-strategic-default-2011-05-13.
6. See generally Debra Pogrund Stark, Unmasking the Predatory Loan in
Sheep’s Clothing: A Legislative Proposal, 21 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 129 (2005)
(providing a definition and explanation of predatory lending and the subprime
market, and articulating homeowners’ confusion and frustration with lending
institutions’ practice of allowing, or even inducing borrowers into, bad loans).
7. Cf. Cecil J. Hunt, II, The Price of Trust: An Examination of Fiduciary Duty
and the Lender-Borrower Relationship, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 719 (1994).  In his
article, Hunt provides a detailed explanation of the unique relationship that is
formed between borrowers and lenders, and the various elements of the rela-
tionship that can involve a special trust on the part of the borrower, and which
give rise to special, fiduciary duties on the part of the lender.  Because the rela-
tionship often involves an exchange of confidential information, and because
both parties have vested financial interests in the transaction, violations of the
fiduciary duty to the borrower can be especially damaging to the relationship,
or to future relationships of a similar nature.
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of underwater mortgages for the greater economic good, without
concerning itself with the moral hazard or ethical obligations sur-
rounding loan repayment.
This Note will argue that the law should resist drawing ethi-
cal conclusions about the decisions of homeowners to default on
mortgage loans and allow banks and lending institutions to fore-
close on their homes.  Imputing concern for an ethical obliga-
tion of borrowers to continue to make payments on an
underwater mortgage onto proposals that would help these bor-
rowers get back on track financially ignores the economic reality
and financial ability of homeowners and places an undue strain
upon the economy.  The result is a situation that prevents bor-
rowers and lenders alike from taking the necessary steps to clean
up past mistakes and work towards improving the economy
nationwide.
To support the assertion that the law should favor remedies
that will help revive the economic efficiency of the housing mar-
ket over the ethical concern that a “moral hazard” will develop
that encourages borrowers to default, this Note will examine sev-
eral important elements of the mortgage loan process as it cur-
rently stands, as well as emerging proposals to assist homeowners
who are underwater on their mortgages and homes.  Part I will
provide a general background of the recent housing crisis, and
will define key terms, such as “underwater” and “moral hazard,”
as they pertain to mortgages and proposed homeowner assis-
tance programs.  Part II will identify and explain the opposition
that lending institutions have put forth with regards to the pro-
posed assistance and refinancing programs, and will also identify
and assess lending institutions’ concerns for the perpetuation of
moral hazard.  Particular focus will be given to the reality of this
concern, and an assessment of available statistics regarding strate-
gic default within recent years will serve to support the assertion
that strategic default is not as prevalent as lending institutions
often claim it to be.  Part III will address the manner in which
moral hazard has influenced legislative proposals and proce-
dures regarding mortgage loan refinancing and repayment assis-
tance programs.  Part III will also address potential damage to
the United States economy as a whole if the law does not set
aside the concern for ethical obligations in the course of the dis-
cussion of economic remedies to underwater mortgages.  Finally,
Part IV will suggest methods that will more effectively assist
homeowners, and that will shift the lending industry’s excessive
focus on moral hazard toward more constructive measures of
reform.
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I. BACKGROUND ON THE HOUSING AND FINANCIAL CRISIS
Explaining the cause and progression of events that led to
what is now often called the “Financial and Housing Crisis,” has
been a challenge for even the most educated and experienced
analysts and scholars.  Providing a plain-language synopsis to the
general public has been even more difficult, and people of all
backgrounds, educational levels, and experiences have struggled
to understand the economic situation that has unfolded over the
course of the past few years.  This barrier to explanation and
comprehension has likely contributed to the frustration of many
who have sought to offer their insight and ideas as to how to
remedy this crisis, and has almost certainly exacerbated been the
outrage and devastation that borrowers and homeowners have
experienced.  Without background information and a basic
understanding of how the mortgage crisis arose, it is not possible
to fully understand its economic and ethical elements, and the
role that these considerations play in determining policy mea-
sures that affect borrowers and lenders alike, as well as the econ-
omy as a whole.
A. The Mortgage Crisis: A Short History of a Long Road to Recovery
To overcome the hurdles to comprehension that are posed
by the incredible amount of information and events that have
contributed to the Financial Crisis, the best summaries have cho-
sen to focus on specific aspects, usually those that are most perti-
nent to their proposal, objective, or theory, and have “trimmed
the fat,” discarding information that is not entirely relevant or
that could increase confusion.  For a streamlined explanation of
the crisis, it is informative to consult speeches given by Professors
William T. Allen and Steven L. Schwarcz at the 2009 New York
University Journal of Law and Business Annual Symposium.8  In
summary, Professors Allen and Schwarcz assert that, “securitiza-
tion markets collapsed due to a systemic cascade of failures ini-
tially triggered by the historically unanticipated depth of the fall
in housing prices.”9  Nevertheless, financial institutions contin-
ued to regularly approve mortgage loans to “risky borrowers,”
with the expectation of refinancing these loans, and thereby
8. William T. Allen & Steven L. Schwarcz, Proceedings of the 2009 Annual
Symposium: Modernizing the Financial Regulatory Structure: Introductory Remarks, 5
N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 339 (2009) (explaining the series of events within the finan-
cial market that ultimately led to the credit crunch and current financial crisis,
and identifying subprime mortgage loans to risky borrowers as the initial
trigger).
9. Id. at 347.
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negating risk factors, through home appreciation.10  These high-
risk borrowers were unable to refinance when home prices
ceased to appreciate, and many defaulted on their mortgage
loans, which in turn caused mortgage-backed securities, and the
financial institutions that issued them, to be downgraded in their
investment grade.11  The loss of credibility as an investment insti-
tution cinched the cash flow to these lenders, which abruptly
caused market prices to “plummet” and, in several cases, led to
the bankruptcy of institutions that had previously reigned as
industry giants for many years.12
B. Mortgage and Foreclosure: A New Language for
American Homeowners
An ancillary effect of the recent economic and financial cri-
sis has been the introduction of a new vocabulary.  A variety of
buzzwords and catchphrases arise regularly in newspaper articles,
and terms previously only used within boardrooms of investment
banks and finance corporations have become a part of the every-
day language of many Americans.  Particularly in the context of
mortgages and foreclosures, many of these frequently used terms
carry specific meanings that are unclear on their face.  To under-
stand an analysis of moral hazard in the arena of mortgage and
foreclosure law, one must be familiar with a concise, and gener-
ally accepted, meaning of certain terms in particular.  While
there may not be universal consensus, even among experts and
academics in the field, as to the meaning of these terms, for pur-
poses of this Note, definitions and meanings for certain impor-
tant and commonly used terms will remain consistent
throughout the piece.  The words and phrases used herein will
reflect the meaning most widely recognized by financial and loan
industry experts and academics.
C. The Concept of “Moral Hazard”
The concept of “moral hazard” has become a controversial
and oft-discussed issue in the area of mortgage and foreclosure
law.13  Many discussions and proposals regarding the mortgage
reconfiguration or refinancing process include some mention of
the concern that struggling borrowers and homeowners will
abuse assistance programs by purposefully and strategically
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 348.
13. See, e.g., White, supra note 4.
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defaulting on their mortgages.14  This “moral hazard,” lending
institutions and critics of the refinancing and assistance pro-
grams say, allows irresponsible borrowers to take the easy way out
by foreclosing on their house rather than struggling through the
repayment and interest requirements that have bankrupted and
devastated so many.15  While it is undeniable that strategic
default is a reality, and is a move that some homeowners who
could feasibly repay their mortgages have decided to make,
“moral hazard” has become a catchphrase used by lending insti-
tutions in protest against refinancing programs and loan
modifications.
Although “moral hazard” has perhaps only recently become
a household phrase in American society, rising to common usage
in the wake of the controversial Bear Stearns bailout,16 it has
been used since the eighteenth century.17  The term has
predominantly been used since the nineteenth century in scena-
rios involving insurance or finance, to categorize the risk that
individuals will purposefully behave in an immoral or dishonest
way in order to gain a benefit only available under specific cir-
cumstances.18  While many authorities in these fields maintain
that the term carries a neutral connotation,19 there is little oppo-
sition to the assertion that the term has a highly pejorative mean-
ing as used in modern media, literature, and discussion.  It is
difficult to imagine modern usage of a phrase containing the
word “hazard” meeting the standard for even a neutral connota-
tion, and this is certainly the case for use of the phrase within the
sphere of mortgage loans and foreclosures.
The concern for moral hazard with regards to mortgage
loan refinancing and assistance policies involves the possibility
that, while helping homeowners who “behaved responsibly but
wound up in trouble,” some borrowers who did, in fact, behave
14. Id.
15. James R. Hagerty, Is Walking Away from Your Mortgage Immoral?, WALL
ST. DEV. BLOG (Dec. 17, 2009, 12:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/developments/
2009/12/17/is-walking-away-from-your-mortgage-immoral/.
16. Frank Ahrens, ‘Moral Hazard’: Why Risk Is Good, WASH. POST, Mar. 19,
2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/18/
AR2008031802873.html.
17. Allard E. Dembe & Leslie I. Boden, Moral Hazard: A Question of Moral-
ity?, 10 J. ENVTL. & OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH POL’Y, 257, 258 (2000).
18. Id. at 261 (identifying the emergence of the term within the growing
insurance industry to categorize individuals who insurance companies believed
would concoct and execute schemes by which they would qualify to collect
insurance payments, after having observed others who were able to collect due
to real experiences and necessity).
19. Id. at 258.
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irresponsibly will also receive assistance.20  In this sense of the
term, the hazard lies with the borrower – that they will disregard
the moral or ethical obligation to repay their mortgage, in light
of the more attractive or more convenient option of seeking and
accepting assistance, refinancing, or modifications.21  There is
widespread fear (primarily among lending institutions, but one
that is shared by critics in other arenas as well) that, as assistance
becomes an increasingly available option to borrowers, those bor-
rowers who are facing mere financial difficulty, rather than com-
plete financial destitution, in mortgage repayment will attempt to
take advantage of these programs.22  Lenders worry that borrow-
ers will become jaded to the seriousness of the promise implicit
in a mortgage agreement.  Borrowers, however, are not the
experts in the loan and finance industry.  Lenders themselves, in
a different but equally dangerous manner, engage in moral haz-
ard by counseling and approving loans to unqualified, or under-
qualified, applicants,23 and by using the premise of ethical con-
cerns to prohibit measures that will objectively improve the eco-
nomic situation.
D. Underwater Mortgages
One of the most common terms that is not always fully or
correctly understood by those who use it is the description of a
homeowner as “underwater” on his or her mortgage.  When dis-
cussing secured loans, such as mortgages, home equity, or auto
loans, a borrower is “underwater” when he or she owes more
debt on a particular asset than the asset is worth.24  Within the
mortgage loan industry, and as discussed within the context of
the mortgage and housing crisis, this would mean that the home-
owner owes more money on his or her mortgage than his or her
home is worth, and is therefore paying amounts each month to
the lending institution that would, if completely paid off over the
20. Simon & Timiraos, supra note 1; see also Cherry, supra note 1 (explain-
ing moral hazard as the fear that providing help to homeowners who are facing
default due to their true inability to repay their mortgage obligations will incen-
tivize other homeowners to default as well, due to their desire to receive the
same assistance).
21. Id.
22. Simon & Timiraos, supra note 1.
23. Stark, supra note 6.
24. For purposes of this Note, this will be the meaning of the term
“underwater” as used throughout the discussion.  For further discussion on the
origin and significance of “underwater” status on mortgage loans, or secured
loans more generally, see Evan Bedard, Definition of Underwater Mortgage, MORT-
GAGE NEWS DAILY (Nov. 19, 2009), http://www.loansafe.org/definition-of-
underwater-mortgage.
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period of time specified in the mortgage contract, exceed the
value at which the homeowner could sell the house on the mar-
ket.  Some homeowners or others unfamiliar with the mortgage
or loan industry confuse being “underwater” with merely being
in debt on a mortgage, or unable to afford and pay mortgage
repayments, but these are very different situations.25  When a
homeowner simply owes payments on their mortgage, these pay-
ments still represent the value of the home, as configured in the
loan agreement.26  When a homeowner has become “underwa-
ter” on a mortgage, his or her debt has exceeded the value of the
home in question.27
Even if the homeowner were able to afford the mortgage
payments, he or she would be paying in excess of the market
price of the home.28  Underwater mortgages are often the focus
of mortgage repayment assistance programs, and home mort-
gages that are underwater can create situations in which home-
owners consider default to be their best option for personal
financial recovery.29
A homeowner may come to be underwater on his loan in
several situations.30  One scenario that leads to underwater mort-
gage loan status occurs when the homeowner refinances his
mortgage after having accrued equity in the home.31  Once
equity is accrued, lenders may approve additional loans to the
borrower, which are based upon the home equity.32  Trouble
arises for the homeowner in this situation when the homeowner
no longer has a significant amount of equity to support the addi-
tional loan.33  The homeowner will be responsible for paying an
additional amount each month for the home loan, when the
home is not valued at the same total amount which the home-
owner must pay.34  A second situation that may cause a home-
owner to go underwater on his or her mortgage loan occurs
when home values drop.35  Homeowners continue to pay the
amount on their mortgage as originally calculated by the home’s
25. Id.
26. Hatter, supra note 3.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Tim Rood, Strategic Default: Inconceivable Assumptions Suddenly Conceiva-
ble, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (May 12, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.mortgage
newsdaily.com/channels/voiceofhousing/211245.aspx.
30. See Hatter, supra note 3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\27-2\NDE209.txt unknown Seq: 9  9-MAY-13 13:35
2013] TREADING IN HIGH TIDE 593
higher value, and then must continue paying this higher amount
for a home that is no longer worth that price on the market.36
In understanding the definition of underwater mortgage
loans, the significance also becomes apparent.  Borrowers are
clearly reluctant to pay more for their homes than the house is
worth.  It is a generally recognized economic (and common
sense) principle that it is rarely in one’s best interest to pay more
for an asset than the amount for which it could be sold on the
open market at any given time.  Even taking into consideration
that homeowners are likely willing to pay more to keep their
homes due to sentimental value, pride, and a desire to avoid the
inconveniences of seeking a new home,37 this additional price
must always have some limit.  Though this above-market price
value of a home will vary from one homeowner to another,
regardless of how high a homeowner is willing to set its ceiling,
the resources available to the homeowner to repay are prohibi-
tive.  Default becomes an attractive, and not unreasonable,
option for many homeowners in this situation.38
II. THE REALITY OF MORAL HAZARD AND STRATEGIC DEFAULT
The reality of strategic default, and whether borrowers and
homeowners willfully seek to disregard any moral obligation
related to the promise of repaying a mortgage has been exten-
sively explored.  What has not been examined as closely, or at
least has not been asserted as forcefully, is whether this concern
has a place in the process of drafting legislation designed to assist
struggling homeowners and to help revive the housing market
and economy.  Before examining this issue, it is helpful to assess
the facts and figures of strategic default among American home-
owners in order to develop a basis for judging whether moral
hazard is a valid and pervasive concern.
36. See Hatter, supra note 3; see also Rood, supra note 29 (providing statis-
tics regarding the sudden and severe decline in home values nationwide, which
dropped between thirty and fifty percent from their peak in 2006, and wiped
out approximately $7 million of home equity in the process).
37. Cherry, supra note 1.
38. Thaler, supra note 2 (taking the argument further, and in the reverse,
to propose that once homeowners are no longer underwater, they will have
little or no incentive to default, and that loan refinancing should seek to match
home values with mortgage payments to negate underwater status, keep home-
owners in their homes, and avoid moral hazard).
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A. Facts and Figures of Strategic Default Among
American Homeowners
At the end of the year in 2010, 11.1 million homeowners
(23.1% of all homes that are mortgaged) were faced with deci-
sions pertaining to their mortgage payments.39  A survey con-
ducted by Fannie Mae revealed that 27% of homeowners with
negative equity would consider strategic default to be a viable
option.40  That statistic is based on a nationwide poll taken dur-
ing the first three months of 2011, and that number was up from
15% who answered accordingly in the January 2010 survey.41
This statistic reveals that people may have begun to understand
the appeal of strategic default.42  A significant percentage of
homeowners have considered this option themselves, and a
much larger number knows, or has known, someone facing the
same situation.  This certainly validates lenders’ concern that the
ethical norm for borrowers has shifted, with the social stigma
associated with default disappearing at what might even be con-
sidered a rapid rate.
Despite statistics reflecting a shift in attitude among Ameri-
cans that defaulting on a loan is a socially acceptable option, evi-
dence also supports the assertion that, while this may be the
personal opinion of more homeowners than in years or genera-
tions past, these homeowners do not always act in accord with
their new beliefs.  While nationwide, “millions of American
homeowners are ‘underwater,’ meaning that they owe more on
their mortgages than their homes are worth,” these statistics can
also be analyzed in specific locations to support the conclusion
that, despite being underwater, homeowners generally choose to
continue to make their mortgage payments regularly.43  In one
particular study conducted in Nevada, nearly two-thirds of home-
owners fall within the category of being “underwater” on their
mortgages, “yet most of them are dutifully continuing to pay
their mortgages, despite substantial financial incentives for walk-
ing away from them.”44
39. Rood, supra note 29 (providing results from a National Housing Sur-
vey conducted by Fannie Mae, with analysis by CoreLogic, which illustrates the
“alarming” increase in the number of homes that are underwater and the num-
ber of homeowners who are concerned about their current financial situation
and ability to make their monthly mortgage payments).
40. Bay, supra note 5.
41. Id.
42. See generally id.
43. Thaler, supra note 2.
44. Id.
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The Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Financial Trust Index
“regularly assesses Americans’ trust in various aspects of the
nation’s financial system,” and found that, in March 2011, there
was a nationwide decrease in the number of strategic defaults.45
The index found that strategic default rates were at 30% across
all states, down from 37% in December of 2010.46  This does not
conclusively prove that lenders and financial institutions have an
unrealistic fear as to the amount of strategic defaulters or poten-
tial strategic defaulters.  However, it does support the assertion
that the problem is not as pervasive as is often claimed.  Addition-
ally, it suggests that any nationwide problem with strategic
default is actually in remission.
B. Reconciling Motives with Actions: Will Strategic Default Be
Another Way in Which American Homeowners Are “Keeping Up
with the Joneses”?
It can be difficult for the average individual to imagine that
a person would knowingly choose to default on an obligation.  It
is even more difficult for those who have not had personal or
firsthand experience with financial difficulties, whether in the
form of income, credit, mortgages, or other loans, to imagine
that a person would purposefully choose not to pay a debt he
owed.47  The moral obligation of debt repayment is a long-stand-
ing and deeply ingrained tenet of human nature.48  Particularly
in the financial realm in the United States, people are well aware
of the consequences of debt and insolvency, as evidenced by the
ever-present television and radio commercials for credit score
and credit history reports, billboards and flyers advertising fore-
closure counseling and attorneys, and background credit checks
performed by virtually every apartment leasing office and
employer.49  The failure to repay what is owed is accompanied by
a significant stigma, both socially and on one’s personal credit
history, to be carried with that individual until reparations are
made, and often times, even thereafter.50  Despite the seemingly
obvious and glaring negatives, many authorities and experts
within the lending and financial fields insist that borrowers will
opt to purposefully default on mortgage loans in an attempt to
ease their way out of increasing interest rates and financial obli-
45. Bay, supra note 5.
46. Id.
47. White, supra note 4, at 986; see also Rood, supra note 29.
48. See Rood, supra note 29.
49. Curtis Bridgeman, The Morality of Jingle Mail: Moral Myths About Strate-
gic Default, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 125 (2011).
50. Id.
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gations that they can, in fact, afford.51  Nevertheless, even where
homeowners may not be concerned with any moral or ethical
obligation to repay their mortgage loans, other factors work to
deter strategic default, including the “economic and emotional
costs of giving up one’s home and moving, the perceived social
stigma of defaulting, and a serious hit to a borrower’s credit rat-
ing.”52  Mortgage loan default and foreclosure are far from desir-
able to homeowners and borrowers.  The repercussions to those
who default on mortgage loans are severe and long lasting, and
affect almost every aspect of borrowers’ lives, and the lives of
their families.53
Concern for moral hazard among lending institutions and
other critics of mortgage assistance programs and reforms is not
entirely unfounded.  The social stigma associated with defaulting
on one’s mortgage, foreclosing on one’s home, or other evi-
dence indicating that a person has made irresponsible financial
decisions or defaulted on a contractual obligation of debt has
been largely cited as a major factor compelling struggling home-
owners to continue to pay their mortgages, even when they are
underwater.54  As with any observable pattern of human behavior
within a society, when an increasing number of people engage in
a particular behavior, that behavior gains social acceptance, and
eventually the stigma is eradicated.55  It is not difficult to see the
logic behind a belief that, as unemployment affects more and
more Americans, and economic conditions impose greater
restraints on saving and spending habits, defaulting on one’s
mortgage and foreclosing on one’s home are not only absolved
of the social stigma of financial failure, but actually garner a cer-
tain degree of sympathy.  Many have come to view default and
foreclosure as an unavoidable tragedy, an inevitable function of a
failing market and the missteps of financial institutions.
51. Rood, supra note 29.
52. Thaler, supra note 2.
53. Cherry, supra note 1 (analyzing a case study of Boston Community
Capital and how moral hazard has not been evident; asserting the argument
that homeowners would not choose foreclosure if there was a way for them to
avoid it, as it destroys their credit score and, in many states, foreclosure can
preclude borrowers who have defaulted from a variety of opportunities, includ-
ing education, loan approval, rental, or even employment).
54. White, supra note 4, at 972 (suggesting that most homeowners choose
not to strategically default as a result of emotional forces, including a strong
desire to avoid shame and guilt associated with foreclosure, and an exaggerated
anxiety over what they believe to be the consequences of foreclosure, when they
often misunderstand or lack information about the process and result of fore-
closure); see also Thaler, supra note 2.
55. Bridgeman, supra note 49; see also Thaler, supra note 2.
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C. An Objective Assessment and Analysis of Mortgage Loan Default
It is true that borrowers who apply for and obtain mortgage
loans sign a promissory note.56  The operative word, “promis-
sory,” specifies a promise on the part of the borrower to pay the
agreed upon monthly amount, along with applicable interest.57
However, the contractual penalty for failure to do so is that the
borrower will lose the property.58  If these are the terms agreed
upon by both parties, lenders and borrowers, from where do any
additional problems arise if the borrower chooses not to pay?59
Two reasons have been given to support the assertion that
defaulting on one’s home mortgage loan is in fact immoral, or at
least more immoral than defaulting on other types of personal
loans.60  The first reason cited is that foreclosures depress the
economy and drive down market value in a community, and
therefore adversely affect other homeowners who have dutifully
paid their monthly mortgage payments and deserve to enjoy the
full value of their homes and communities.61  The second reason
is that default allegedly degrades the character of the borrower,
and perpetuates a general disregard for the sanctity of promises
and contractual agreements.62  Academics and experts in the
field of business ethics argue that the loan agreement is a prom-
ise on the part of the borrower to repay the loan amount, but is
56. Roger Lowenstein, Just Walk Away: Why Should Underwater Homeowners
Behave Any Different from Banks?, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 10, 2010, at 15.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See id. (contrasting corporations, who routinely choose to default on
mortgages, yet are much better equipped to handle the financial obligations
incurred with these loans and are rarely admonished for their strategic default,
with the average mortgaged homeowner, who is expected to dutifully pay more
than he is capable to avoid the stigma of being “unethical” and the credit and
social consequences that accompany such default).  For an in-depth discussion
and analysis of the importance of understanding and applying contract law as
the key to resolving dilemmas in the home mortgage arena, see Bridgeman,
supra note 49.  The author argues that contract law contains inherently moral
principles, and that to allow strategic default on home loans will effectively shift
the manner in which people regard contractual duties and obligations in a way
that is most likely detrimental to the legal and ethical climate of contract law.
Bridgeman largely seeks to evaluate and provide an opposing viewpoint to the
arguments set forth by Brent T. White, author of The Morality of Strategic Default
and Take This House and Shove It: The Emotional Drivers of Strategic Default, both of
which set forth extensive arguments as to why strategic default is not immoral,
and should be permissible where it makes financial sense for the homeowner to
purposefully choose to cease monthly mortgage payments and allow his or her
home to be foreclosed upon.
60. Lowenstein, supra note 56, at 16.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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also a promise to repay interest accrued on the loan.63  In
defaulting on the mortgage, these borrowers are breaking the
promise to pay the additional amount owed in interest.64  Fur-
thermore, because foreclosure proceedings and the actual evic-
tion process generally do not conclude for a year, or sometimes
more, after the homeowner stops making his or her monthly pay-
ments, the homeowner is able to remain in the home rent-free
until legal proceedings have been resolved.65  This arguably pro-
vides at the very least a convenience, and at most a benefit, to a
borrower who has defaulted on a promise made.  It is this aspect
of the argument upon which lending institutions have focused
their battle behind the shield of moral hazard.  However, both of
these arguments ignore many unforeseeable elements that factor
into a homeowner’s inability to repay his mortgage or a bor-
rower’s decision to default on his mortgage loan.  When viewed
in light of the currently dismal economic and employment cli-
mates in the United States, these factors suddenly lose much of
the muster they may have had in previous times, where borrowers
enjoyed a more prosperous economic setting.  Borrowers do
have obligations to lending institutions, but they have obligations
to a host of other parties as well, including other lenders, their
families, and themselves.66
The reality of the situation is that there is and should be no
real problem with allowing these contracts to be enforced
according to the terms that they contain.  Where a homeowner
has failed to make monthly mortgage payments, for whatever rea-
son, foreclosure is the legally enforceable contractual conse-
quence.  The argument that homeowners have an ethical
obligation to repay mortgages is used as a defensive tool on the
part of the lending institutions to resist legislative and policy pro-
posals that would require them to work with homeowners to refi-
nance or reconfigure mortgages, or with government assistance
programs that would provide struggling homeowners with the
63. Hagerty, supra note 15.
64. Id.
65. Paul Krugman, One to the Left, N.Y. TIMES OP. PAGES: THE CONSCIENCE
OF A LIBERAL (Feb. 12, 2008, 2:13 PM), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/
2008/02/12/one-to-the-left/ (The author explains how the current situation
allows homeowners to strategically default and remain in their homes because
the bank often delays or fails to take action to foreclose and evict.  These home-
owners then simply purchase another foreclosed-upon house “one door to the
left” and thus perpetuate a cycle of default.); see also Hagerty, supra note 15
(referencing the lapse in time between the stopped mortgage payments and
action taken against the homeowner who has defaulted, during which time the
homeowner may remain in the home “rent-free”).
66. Hagerty, supra note 15.
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necessary assistance to allow them to take steps to pull their
heads above water and salvage their financial futures.  Further-
more, to make a general assertion that homeowners have an ethi-
cal obligation to repay mortgages ignores the reality of many
foreclosure situations, specifically where banks themselves
behaved unethically in granting subprime loans under fraudu-
lent circumstances to homeowners who may otherwise not have
been granted a mortgage in the first place.67
III. THE MANNER IN WHICH CONCERN FOR MORAL HAZARD
INFLUENCES MORTGAGE REFINANCING
POLICY FORMATION
There is evidence that moral hazard is a real factor, and one
to which at least some homeowners will succumb, but lending
and financial institutions have chosen to rely on this concern to
an unfounded degree when asserting their opposition to assis-
tance programs.68  The argument likely perpetuates within the
financial industry as a means of self-preservation, and is used as a
sword against proposed policy and legislation that would compel
financial and lending institutions to acquiesce to loan modifica-
tion and mortgage reconfiguration assistance programs seeking
to help those at risk of default.69
Lending institutions are outspoken opponents to mortgage
reconfiguration and repayment assistance programs, and they
are supported by critics of the proposals from academic and busi-
ness fields as well.70  This position is backed by lenders’ claims
that they will suffer from granting financial assistance to home-
owners.  In many scenarios, lending institutions have little to lose
in granting loans to borrowing homeowners, even where it is
highly likely that the borrower will be unable to make payments
on the loan within ten years, or even fewer, because lending insti-
tutions usually sell the loan to a mortgage loan pool.71  This sale
of the loan to the mortgage loan pool shields the original lender
67. Stark, supra note 6, at 134.
68. Crespi, supra note 4, at 182.
69. MANUEL ADELINO ET AL., FED. RESERVE OF BOS., WHY DON’T LENDERS
RENEGOTIATE MORE HOME MORTGAGES? REDEFAULTS, SELF-CURES, AND SECURI-
TIZATION, PUBLIC POLICY DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 09-4 (2009).
70. Bridgeman, supra note 49 (providing a detailed and in-depth argu-
ment from a law professor as to why strategic default is immoral and damaging
to the legal climate in the United States).
71. Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The
Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1261–65 (2002);
Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder
in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 512–13 (2002).
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from the consequences of the default.72  As a result, lending
institutions’ primary concern with proposals that will allow bor-
rowers to default on their mortgage loans is not rooted in
finances.  Lenders argue that the most extensive damage will
occur not in immediate situations where borrowers are facing
default, but rather by what lenders believe will be the influx of
borrowers who will strategically default to receive the same
treatment.73
“Large lenders have long resisted debt forgiveness because
of fears that it creates a moral hazard, meaning it could
encourage borrowers to take out risky loans in the future because
the consequences would not be so bad, or to default to qualify
for principal reduction.”74  Lenders instead “argue that other
types of loan modifications achieve the same goal” without the
fear of raising widespread ethical implications.75
A. Perception Is Reality: Or Is It?
It cannot be denied that some homeowners do make an
informed decision to strategically default on their mortgages.
However, it is unacceptable to characterize an entire population
based upon the behavior of some of its members, even though
that behavior may be recognized as unethical, unfair, or even
reprehensible.  Furthermore, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
make accurate generalized assumptions about homeowners and
strategic default, as each homeowner has a unique situation.
Homeowners, like any cross-section of the population, come
from varied backgrounds, have any number of personal obliga-
tions to uphold, and adhere to a broad spectrum of ethical
beliefs and value systems.76  All of these factors contribute to a
borrower’s attitude toward loans and debt well before even the
initial decision to take out a mortgage loan.
The personal and lifestyle characteristics of mortgagors con-
tinue to factor into every stage of the mortgage process, weighing
72. See Eggert, supra note 71, at 538, 541.
73. Krugman, supra note 65.
74. Sheila Dewan, Freddie and Fannie Reject Debt Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2011, at B1.
75. Id.
76. See Hagerty, supra note 15 (discussing the fact that borrowers and
homeowners owe a variety of duties to various parties, including multiple lend-
ing institutions, their businesses, their families, and themselves, and that these
duties include both the legal and contractual obligation to repay on debts
owed, but also include the obligation to take care of dependents and to behave
in a manner that perpetuates the borrowers’ own personal moral code—one
that he wishes to pass along to his children and neighbors).
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into the amount of loan with which the borrower feels comforta-
ble borrowing, the promptness with which monthly payments are
made, the remedies and assistance sought upon first signs of
trouble with repayments, and the decision to default and fore-
close.77  Some homeowners may prioritize making payments on
the debt incurred on their homes, but are also willing to max out
credit card after credit card.  Others may have no qualms about
walking away from their homes, but are very concerned about
their inability to repay educational loans or credit card debt, and
may take extremely frugal and scrupulous measures to keep on
top of these payments.  As a result of the many external factors
involved in the decision-making process, it is inaccurate for lend-
ing institutions to generalize borrowers as a group of people who
are likely to behave in a particular manner, namely by strategi-
cally defaulting or seeking and accepting unwarranted assistance
from government programs designed to help those in true need.
Accordingly, this concern should not be a serious factor in policy
formation for mortgage refinancing and assistance programs.
B. Recent and Current Legislative and Policy Proposals Designed to
Assist Homeowners Facing Default and Foreclosure and Evidence of
Moral Hazard’s Role in the Formation of These Plans
Currently, under the Home Affordable Modification Pro-
gram (HAMP), which is a subset of the Making Home Affordable
Act, homeowners who are determined to be eligible for a reduc-
tion in their monthly mortgage payments are subject to a trial
period of three or four months to show that they are able to
make the reduced payments.78  While those who support this
plan argue that it helps to reduce the risk of moral hazard, it can
also be argued that it has no effect, as it still provides the benefit
of reduced payments, and may achieve the same goal of those
homeowners who would choose to strategically default, namely
to improve their financial situation rather than continue with
their agreed upon mortgage contract.
Another program under the umbrella of the government’s
initiative to “Make Home Affordable,” the Home Affordable Refi-
nance Program (HARP),79 has struggled to achieve the success
77. University of Alabama at Birmingham, Consumer Behavior and Lifestyle
Traits Influence Foreclosure Rates, SCIENCE DAILY (January 14, 2010), http://www.
sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/01/100114143511.htm.
78. Making Home Affordable, MAKINGHOMEAFFORDABLE.GOV, http://www.
makinghomeaffordable.gov/pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
79. Home Affordable Refinance Program (HARP), MAKINGHOMEAFFORD-
ABLE.GOV, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/lower-rates/
Pages/harp.aspx (last visited Feb. 16, 2013).
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rate for which it was designed.  The HARP program originated in
2008, and stated a goal of assisting five million borrowers.80  As of
August, fewer than 895,000 borrowers have been helped by the
HARP program.81  The hope is that these numbers will double by
2013,82 but for this to come to fruition, lending institutions will
have to comply with the initiative.  Legislation under the Obama
Administration has provided some improvement in the mortgage
situation nationwide, particularly when compared to the essential
failure of previous legislation.83  Despite this improvement, how-
ever, the programs have not achieved their original goals, and
also fail to quell the fears of lending institutions as to the
expected flood of homeowners seeking to utilize assistance pro-
grams and the changes in societal attitudes toward mortgage
loan obligations that lending institutions believe will stem from
these programs.84
There have been suggestions made which propose that
homeowners seeking to obtain mortgage refinancing or seeking
to receive other forms of government-provided assistance pro-
vide some type of non-monetary or service-based compensation.
This proposal would further egalitarian purposes and act as a
deterrent to those who may seek to obtain financial assistance for
strategic default “free of charge.”  These proposals have been
compared to other government assistance programs, such as
unemployment, which demands that recipients make certain
active efforts in exchange for monetary support.  One scholar has
proposed, as a means to reduce the risk of moral hazard, a
requirement of 200 hours of community service performed by
homeowners in exchange for a mortgage bailout.85  This argua-
bly serves as both a deterrent and a source of retribution with
respect to those who seek to be approved for such an assistance
program.  The question remains, however, whether these func-
tions would be appropriate for homeowners who are underwater
as the result of legitimate financial and economic hardship, and
whether these functions would be effective for those who make
the active and informed choice to default.
80. Lorraine Woellert, U.S. Mortgage Plan Expands to Refinance Underwater
Borrowers, BUS. WK. (Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-
11-04/u-s-mortgage-plan-expands-to-refinance-underwater-borrowers.html.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Crespi, supra note 4, at 182.
84. Id. at 182–83.
85. Michael H. LeRoy, The Inequality of Sacrifice—Reducing Moral Hazard for
Bailed-Out Homeowners: The Case for Compulsory Community Service, ILL. PUB. L. &
LEGAL THEORY RES. PAPERS SERIES NO. 09-18 (Nov. 30, 2009), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1515983.
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C. Policies and Initiatives Should Foster an Objective Mission of
Education and Self-Regulation of the Lending Industry to Help
Prevent Default and Foreclosure
Borrowers are often uneducated, or undereducated, about
the process and penalties of taking out mortgages, and rely on
the advice of financial and lending experts.86  When these
experts fail to take the borrowers’ situations and interests into
account, this reliance creates a confusing and harmful financial
situation for the borrower, which in turn creates problems for
the lender and the economy on a larger scale.87  Realistically, in
failing to adhere to a fiduciary duty and standard of care with
respect to borrowers, investment advisers also fall short of the
fiduciary duty they owe to their firms.
As part of the hope to better unify the interests and needs of
borrowers and lenders, recent government proposals have
sought to increase accountability of lenders and to increase trans-
parency in the lending and securitization process.88 The Obama
Administration has been developing rules that will require lend-
ers and other financial advisers to keep greater “‘skin in the
game’ and to align incentives across the securitization chain.”89
One major step in this direction was codified by the Dodd-Frank
Act, which included provisions that charged the Securities and
Exchange Commission with the responsibility to set stricter dis-
closure requirements.90  The purpose of this was two-fold: to
enable investors to more easily understand the underlying risks
of securities and loans, and to establish an Office of Credit Rat-
ings to more effectively regulate credit rating agencies.91
Examination of management and regulatory behaviors
within the financial sector has provided cause for legitimate con-
cern as to the financial and lending industries’ ability to self-reg-
ulate practices, procedures, and professionals within the
industry.  One of the emerging theories as to why there has been
a notable shift in the attitudes of lending institutions, and the
professionals that operate within them, that manifests as a lack of
trust for borrowers is what has been dubbed the “Corporate Psy-
86. Hunt, supra note 7, at 746–49.
87. Stark, supra note 6, at 134.
88. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Obama Administration Plan
Provides Path Forward for Reforming America’s Housing Finance Market,
Winding Down Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http:/
/www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1059.aspx.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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chopath Theory.”92  Though this is a relatively new proposal, and
one that will require more extensive research and analysis to gain
acceptance, studies conducted thus far provide at least a founda-
tion for this explanation.93  In summary, the Corporate Psycho-
path Theory asserts that there is an identifiable propensity of the
financial industry to attract, hire, and promote agents with partic-
ular personality traits.94  The personality traits emerging as
“desirable” within the culture of the financial industry are identi-
fied in individuals who “lack a conscience, have few emotions,
and display an inability to have any feelings, sympathy, or empa-
thy for other people.”95  These individuals have, at best, wayward
moral compasses, and, at worst, sociopathic tendencies.96  It is
likely that these types of personal characteristics allow individuals
to succeed in the business and financial worlds because these are
people that others often admire for their “thick skin” and ability
to thrive in chaotic settings that would rattle and distract more
emotionally attuned professionals.97  Individuals who are less
capable of understanding opposing points of view are often more
direct and persistent in hostile situations, and are less likely to
back down for fear of offending, insulting, or otherwise damag-
ing, a relationship with another person.98
As a result of recent changes in the “moral climate”99 of the
financial and loan industry, particularly of Wall Street financial
institutions, these individuals have become the decision-makers
of the finance industry, and have gained the power to influence
an entire system that is an essential tenet of not only the Ameri-
can economy, but the international economy as well.100  This cli-
mate of “heartless success” is self-perpetuating within the arena
of financial institutions, but has a much broader (and much
more devastating) economic effect on borrowers who lack the
92. Clive R. Boddy, The Corporate Psychopaths Theory of the Global Financial
Crisis, 102 J. BUS. ETHICS 255 (2011); see also Brian Basham, Beware Corporate
Psychopaths—They Are Still Occupying Positions of Power, THE INDEP. (Dec. 29,
2011), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/comment/
brian-basham-beware-corporate-psychopaths—they-are-still-occupying-positions-
of-power-6282502.html.
93. See Boddy, supra note 92.
94. Id.
95. William D. Cohan, Did Psychopaths Take Over Wall Street Asylum?,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 2, 2012, 7:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/20
12-01-03/did-psychopaths-take-over-wall-street-asylum-commentary-by-william-
cohan.html; see Boddy, supra note 92.
96. See Boddy, supra note 92.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Cohan, supra note 95; see also Boddy, supra note 92.
100. See Boddy, supra note 92.
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power to influence or correct the ethical standards of the institu-
tions from which they receive loans.101  To protect those most
adversely affected by questionable actions of financial institu-
tions, as well as the overall economic and ethical climate of the
United States, the legal system should step in to regulate where
there is no sense of ethical obligation or duty, or where attempts
to institute corporate responsibility or to self-regulate the indus-
try from within have failed.
VI. PROPOSAL
As a practical matter, ethical concerns should largely be
removed from the discourse of legislative actions that will assist
homeowners in resolving their mortgages and cleaning up their
financial situations and credit.  The harsh reality of the current
economy requires the government to take necessary measures to
correct the facts and figures of homeowners’ finances as one step
in a method to bust the economic slump.  Lending institutions’
persistent cries of moral hazard stand as one barrier to this goal.
To move toward correcting the problems of the mortgage crisis,
lending institutions can remove their focus on the potential for
homeowners to behave unethically, and shift the focus to the eth-
ics of their own industry.  This can be accomplished through a
continued emphasis on the fiduciary duty of the lender, through
implementing measures to encourage self-regulation within the
lending and financial industry, and by creating laws when self-
regulation is unable to achieve the necessary goals.  Additionally,
proposed measures to assist struggling homeowners should
clearly articulate the objective of resolving the mortgage and
housing crises in the most economically efficient and practical
manner possible, and should clearly set forth the means by which
this goal may be accomplished.
A. The Continued Importance of Fiduciary Duties That Lending
Institutions Owe to Borrowers
To continue in the vein of a recent legal trend, continued
emphasis should be placed upon the fiduciary duty of the lender
and loan broker,102 including the duty to fully inform borrowers
101. Id.
102. Hunt, supra note 7, at 724–26; see also David Unseth, Note, What Level
of Fiduciary Duty Should Mortgage Brokers Owe Their Borrowers?, 75 WASH. U. L. Q.
1737, 1738–51 (1997) (providing a concise summary and explanation of the
fiduciary relationships that arise within the mortgage industry, and the varying
degrees of legal requirements and consequences arising from these
relationships).
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and potential borrowers of the risks involved in taking out mort-
gages, and the realistic consequences of default and foreclosure,
strategic or otherwise.  Though this should go without saying,
lenders must refuse to approve loans when presented with infor-
mation that is incomplete or inaccurate.103  The law should pro-
hibit lending institutions from engaging in predatory lending
tactics, and should encourage or mandate that lenders take mea-
sures to ensure that the terms of the loan, and the promises
made between the lender and borrower, are accurately reflected
in the loan documents.104  Where the lender has concerns as to
the borrowers’ ability to repay the mortgage loan for which they
have applied, the lender should advise clients accordingly as to
these concerns.105  Lenders should also work to include loan
counseling wherever possible, as “counseling the borrower on
issues relating to the affordability of the loan . . . rather than
prohibiting lenders and borrowers from entering into such loans
has the advantage of allowing the borrower to make an informed
decision in light of his special circumstances.”106  Under a provi-
sion expounded in section 1404 “Additional Standards and
Requirements” of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act of 2010, lending institutions are required
to provide “disclosure and counseling for first-time borrowers
prior to consummation of loans with negative amortization
secured by ‘dwelling.’”107  This is an excellent example of how
the law has reformed the mortgage loan process from the front-
end as a preventative method.  It is also notable because it exem-
plifies the ability to remove the concern for borrowers’ ethical
considerations in dealing with their mortgages and focus on an
objective means by which to resolve the problem.  The law can
also take this a step further, and can encourage, or perhaps even
103. Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate
Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111 (2002); see also EDWARD VINCENT MUR-
PHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33930, SUBPRIME MORTGAGES: PRIMER ON CUR-
RENT LENDING AND FORECLOSURE ISSUES (2007).
104. Stark, supra note 6, at 140; see also Jeanette Bradley & Peter Skillern,
Predatory Lending: Banks Trick Poor into Expensive Loans, 227 DOLLARS & SENSE
(2000), available at http://www.dollarsandsense.org/archives/2000/0100brad-
ley.html.
105. Stark, supra note 6, at 144.
106. Id. at 145.
107. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, SUMMARY OF MORTGAGE RELATED PROVISIONS
OF THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT 10
(2010), available at http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/MIRA/MBA
SummaryofDoddFrank.pdf (providing plain language summaries of the sec-
tions and provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act that pertain to mortgages and to
lending institutions); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1414, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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require, that lending institutions provide loan counseling to bor-
rowers who are not just first-timers, particularly where there may
be potential “red flags” on the borrowers’ credit report or
history.
Economic progress has already been evident through the
implementation of homeowner assistance programs, and these
programs should continue, and perhaps even increase, until the
housing and mortgage market has been restored to a level where
it can function without government assistance.108  Lenders must
not be permitted to resist assistance programs for fear of moral
hazard on the part of homeowners.
B. The Role That the Fear of Moral Hazard Has Played in
Legislative and Policy Formation of Mortgage Refinancing and
Assistance Programs
Complicating the assessment of the best steps the law can
take to help resolve issues of the mortgage crisis is the manipula-
tive manner in which lending institutions have inflated moral
hazard as a factor within the legislative and political discourse
over proposed means by which the mortgage and housing crisis
may be resolved.109  Experts and academics have conducted
research and analysis on the morality of homeowners’ behavior
and the ethical considerations that guide the decision-making
process of the mortgage repayment and foreclosure process.110
Significantly less attention has been paid to ethical considera-
tions on the part of lenders.  Even when they have been
addressed and questioned as to their own ethical shortcomings
in the mortgage crisis, lending institutions have been largely suc-
cessful at turning the conversation on its head, citing moral haz-
ard and the behavior of borrowers and homeowners as an
inextricable cause of any decisions made, or positions taken, by
lending institutions.111  This “chicken and egg” explanatory tac-
tic has allowed lending institutions to keep the focus of the
media and the public on the ethical discussion of moral hazard,
at times at the expense of discussing the more relevant economic
elements of the situation.112  The frequent mention of moral haz-
ard and concern for strategic default has taken unwarranted pre-
cedent in the debate, and has caused the law and governing
108. See generally Crespi, supra note 4.
109. See Thaler, supra note 2.
110. See Cherry, supra note 1; see also Rood, supra note 29; White, supra
note 4.
111. See Crespi, supra note 4, at 182.
112. Id.
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bodies to include ethical concerns as a factor in their determina-
tions as to how this crisis may best be resolved.113
Moral hazard is, and will continue to be, an area of concern
and focus among experts, academics, and lay persons in the
arena of mortgage and foreclosure law and policy.  In light of
recent debate over the prevalence of this factor, and lenders’
often vehement opposition to new policies or proposals that may
encourage, or at least accept, strategic default as a means of han-
dling underwater mortgages, new research is emerging that can
better assess the reality of this problem.  In turn, there is hope
that government assistance and other reforms can better address
the most dire needs of those trapped underwater.  In formulat-
ing these policies, it is essential that a balance be struck between
the subjective standard of moral and ethical obligations to repay
debt owed on mortgage loans and an objective economic stan-
dard of relieving struggling homeowners of the unmanageable
burden of paying more in mortgage and interest than their
homes are worth.  Programs designed to match homeowners’
monthly payments with the market value of their homes are
arguably a manner in which this balance can be achieved, as they
will not force borrowers out of their homes, but will also not
relieve them of an excessive amount of their debt, such as to
damage lending institutions.  The risk that this solution will
erode the ethical elements of loan obligations and cause default
to become acceptable and commonplace is reduced because bor-
rowers are still responsible for fulfilling monthly financial obliga-
tions to lenders, and will still be subject to penalties when they
fail to meet their reconfigured mortgage obligations.
VII. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, borrowers and lenders do not, or at least should
not, have such different goals.  While each entity is concerned
primarily with its own immediate interests and economic survival
and prosperity, this is a micro-view.  Looking at the big picture,
both borrowers and lenders benefit from an efficiently function-
ing and growing economy.  It then follows that both parties
should be willing to work toward achieving that end goal.  In the
aftermath of the financial and housing crisis, pursuing what had
previously been the status quo is the first step to economic and
financial recovery.  Borrowers must get their heads above water
on their mortgage and debt obligations.  Lenders must adapt to
the current economic situation, which is significantly less sunny
than it has been in some time, and must accept that they will be
113. Bridgeman, supra note 49, at 125.
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required to work within the context of current conditions, and
should adjust profit expectations accordingly.  Lenders must
cease to use the defense of “moral hazard” as a shield against
progress toward economic recovery.  Given their important role
in ensuring the financial and economic health of individual bor-
rowers, and the nation as a whole, lending institutions cannot
afford to continue to be cast as the “enemy.”
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